Past and future implications of near-misses and their emotional consequences by Zhang,  Q. & Covey,  J.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
17 March 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Zhang, Q. and Covey, J. (2014) 'Past and future implications of near-misses and their emotional
consequences.', Experimental psychology., 61 (2). pp. 118-126.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000231
Publisher's copyright statement:
Experimental Psychology, 61, 2, c© 2014 by Hogrefe Publishing. This article does not exactly replicate the ﬁnal version
published in the journal "Experimental Psychology". It is not a copy of the original published article and is not
suitable for citation.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
  1 
 
 
 
 
Past and Future Implications of Near-Misses and Their Emotional 
Consequences 
 
Qiyuan Zhang and Judith Covey 
Durham University UK 
 
 
 
Author Note 
Correspondence should be addressed to Dr Judith Covey, Department of 
Psychology, Wolfson Research Institute, Durham University, Queen’s Campus, 
Stockton-on-Tees TS17 6BH, UK. j.a.covey@durham.ac.uk; Tel +44 (0)191 334 0104; 
Fax +44 (0)191 334 0006 
 
  2 
Abstract  
The Reflection and Evaluation Model (REM) of comparative thinking predicts 
that temporal perspective could moderate people’s emotional reactions to close 
counterfactuals following near-misses (Markman & McMullen, 2003). The experiments 
reported in this paper tested predictions derived from this theory by examining how 
people’s emotional reactions to a near-miss at goal during a football match (Experiment 
1) or a close score in a TV game show (Experiment 2) depended on the level of 
perceived future possibility. In support of the theory it was found that the presence of 
future possibility enhanced affective assimilation (e.g., if the near-miss occurred at the 
beginning of the game the players who had nearly scored were hopeful of future success) 
whereas the absence of future possibility enhanced affective contrast (e.g., if the near-
miss occurred at the end of the game the players who had nearly scored were 
disappointed about missing an opportunity). Furthermore the experiments built upon our 
theoretical understanding by exploring the mechanisms which produce assimilation and 
contrast effects. In Experiment 1 we examined the incidence of present-oriented or 
future-oriented thinking, and in Experiment 2 we examined the mediating role of 
counterfactual thinking in the observed effect of proximity on emotions by testing 
whether stronger counterfactuals (measured using counterfactual probability estimates) 
produce bigger contrast and assimilation effects. While the results of these 
investigations generally support the REM, they also highlight the necessity to consider 
other psychological mechanisms (e.g., social comparison), in addition to counterfactual 
thinking, that might contribute to the emotional consequences of near-miss outcomes.   
Keywords: close counterfactuals; near-miss; contrast effect; assimilation effect; 
temporal perspective; the Reflection and Evaluation Model. 
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Past and Future Implications of Near-Misses and Their Emotional Consequences 
The sense that “something was close to happening” is a powerful psychological 
phenomenon. A good illustration is the study by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), where 
Mr Tees, who missed his flight by five minutes, was judged by 96 percent of 
participants to be more upset than Mr Crane, who missed by half an hour. Markman and 
McMullen’ (2003) Reflection and Evaluation Model (REM) of comparative thinking 
proposes two distinctive psychological experiences that follow near-misses. 
Affective contrast arises when people generate counterfactual representations 
(i.e, how things could have been different) after near-misses and use them as 
comparison standards to evaluate their current standings (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, 
& McMullen, 1993; Roese, 1994, 1997). Thus, being close to a desirable outcome 
worsens one’s mood by bringing about frustration or disappointment. In the same way, 
being close to an undesirable outcome improves one’s mood by bringing about relief or 
thankfulness. Evidence for this contrast effect comes from Medvec and Savisky (1997), 
who demonstrated a “satisfaction reversal”: students whose exam score was close to a 
higher grade boundary reported less satisfaction than those whose score was in the same 
grade but close to the lower grade boundary (see also Macrae, Milne, & Griffiths, 1993; 
Medvec, Gilovich, & Madey, 1995; Meyerslevy & Maheswaran, 1992; Miller & 
McFarland, 1986). 
In comparison, affective assimilation arises when people experience the 
counterfactual as if it were true (Markman & McMullen, 2003; McMullen, 1997; 
McMullen & Markman, 2000). To illustrate, McMullen (1997, p.78) cited a real-life 
incident in which passengers who switched their flight and missed a fatal air-crash 
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reported mainly negative emotions towards their lucky escape. The narrow escape and 
counterfactual entailed (e.g., “I could have been killed”) appears to have led to negative 
rather than positive emotions (e.g., fearfulness). 
According to the REM, a number of factors influence the relative strengths of 
contrast and assimilation effects including temporal perspective. If “an event is 
perceived as a final or completed event” (Markman & McMullen, 2003, p.256), the 
future possibility to change the outcome is closed and people are encouraged to focus 
on the past (e.g., “I could have got a higher/lower grade but I didn’t”). This should 
evoke evaluative simulation, enhance the contrast effect and bring about disappointment 
or relief. In contrast, if an event is perceived “as part of a series of events that will 
continue into the future”, the future possibility to change the outcome remains open and 
people are encouraged to focus on the future (e.g., “I could have got a higher/lower 
grade and I will next time”). This should evoke reflective simulation, enhance the 
assimilation effect and bring about hopefulness or fearfulness. 
Although McMullen and Markman (2002, Study 2) provided evidence for this 
proposition it is open to alternative explanations. Participants were provided with a 
play-by-play account of one half of a basketball game. The teams ended up with very 
close scores or scores far apart. Affective contrast was observed when participants were 
told they were reading about the second half (low future possibility) –e.g., the 
supporters of the losing team reported worse moods if the scores were close than if it 
was a blowout. However, the reverse was found when participants were told they were 
reading about the first half (high future possibility), suggesting affective assimilation. 
Also intriguingly, they found that the assimilation effects at half-time were strong 
  5 
enough to cause the team which was 1-point ahead to feel worse than the team which 
was 1-point behind – thereby producing an “assimilation-based satisfaction reversal”. 
Although these results support the temporal perspective hypothesis, there are 
doubts whether the differences in affect between the close and far conditions as well as 
the satisfaction reversal found at half-time were truly caused by counterfactual-based 
assimilation effects. According to McMullen and Markman (2002) counterfactual 
alternatives are more readily apparent in close situations because it is easier to see how 
things could have turned out differently. Hence, the team that is only 1-point down at 
half-time is more likely to see an opportunity to win and the team that is only 1-point 
ahead sees more of a threat. However, two features unrelated to the activation of 
counterfactuals may have contributed to heightened expectations of winning (or losing) 
in the close condition. 
Firstly, by presenting a play-by-play account of the game McMullen and 
Markman (2002) may have unintentionally created different perceptions of velocity in 
the close and far conditions. Participants may have drawn inferences from the changing 
scores throughout the half that the players were more likely to be on a trajectory 
towards winning (or losing) in the close condition. Secondly, heightened expectations 
might also have been caused by the players’ objective proximity to future winning or 
losing because the score from the first half will be carried over to the second half. Thus, 
the team which was 1-point behind (or ahead) at half-time would have a smaller gap to 
close (or defend) between their score and the opponent’s in the second half and were 
therefore objectively more likely to win (or lose) the game. Hence, the differences in 
affect between the close and blowout conditions and the satisfaction reversal could have 
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had little to do with counterfactual thinking – being 1-point ahead (or behind) at half-
time feels worse (or better) than being 15-points ahead simply because there is an 
objectively higher chance of losing (or gaining) the lead in the second half.  
The existing evidence for the enhancement of affective assimilation in the 
presence of future possibility is therefore open to alternative explanations.  The two 
experiments reported here eliminated these alternatives by avoiding the confounding 
effects of both perceived trajectory and objective proximity. The experiments therefore 
provide superior tests of the REM’s predictions. 
In both experiments we tested whether the overall effect of proximity on affect 
in winning and losing situations (path c in Figure 1a) depends on the perception of 
future possibility: The contrast effect will be enhanced when future possibility is low 
(i.e., winning by a small margin will be more pleasurable and losing by a small margin 
will be more disappointing), whereas the assimilation effect will be enhanced when 
future possibility is high (i.e., winning by a small margin will be less pleasurable and 
losing by a small margin with be less disappointing). 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Experiment 1 also examined the temporal focus of people’s thoughts. This 
allowed us to explore the mechanisms which produce assimilation effects (i.e., in the 
presence of future possibility we expected a higher incidence of future-oriented thinking) 
and contrast effects (i.e., in the absence of future possibility we expected a higher 
incidence of past-oriented thinking). 
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A different method for exploring the mechanisms was adopted in Experiment 2 
by examining whether the effect of proximity on emotions could be explained by the 
mediating role of counterfactual probability estimates – i.e., how likely things could 
have turned out differently (denoted by path ab in Figure 1b), and whether the nature of 
this mediation is moderated by people’s perception of future possibility. Investigating 
counterfactual probability estimates departs from the traditional method of measuring 
counterfactual thinking by counting the frequency of counterfactual statements 
generated in free-style thought listing tasks (e.g., Markman et al., 1993; Meyerslevy & 
Maheswaran, 1992; Roese & Olson, 1996, 1997). However, estimates have been shown 
to be a stronger predictor for emotions than counterfactual frequency and they therefore 
provide a reliable measure of counterfactual potency (Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman, & 
Tormala, 2011). Establishing their mediating role therefore provides more direct 
evidence of the role of counterfactual thinking in shaping people’s emotions.  
Experiment 1 
The first experiment compared the emotional consequences of a near-miss goal 
scoring incident that occurred either at the beginning or end of a soccer match. We 
predicted that when the near-miss occurred at the end participants would judge that the 
attackers who nearly scored a goal would feel worse than the defenders who nearly 
conceded. This is because there is little time left for a goal to be scored (low future 
possibility) and the players are more likely to dwell on the past implications of the 
counterfactual which promotes affective contrast - the attackers feel disappointed in 
missing an opportunity whereas the defenders feel relieved in averting a misfortune. 
Nonetheless, this pattern should be reversed when the near-miss occurred at the 
beginning. This is because there is plenty of time left for a goal to be scored (high future 
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possibility) and the players are more likely to dwell on the future implications of the 
counterfactual which promotes affective assimilation - the attackers are hopeful because 
the near-miss signals future success whereas the defenders are fearful because it signals 
future failure. 
It is important to note that the score was unchanged by the near-miss at goal. 
Hence, whilst the incident might affect the players’ expectations about which team is 
the more likely winner at the end of the match, it has not affected their objective 
proximity to winning. The effects that temporal perspective has on the emotional 
consequences of this near-miss can therefore only be explained by whether the 
counterfactual provoked by the incident promotes affective contrast or affective 
assimilation. Moreover, this explanation was tested further by coding the reasons 
participants provided for their judgments. We predicted that past-oriented thoughts 
associated with affective contrast would be activated when the near-miss occurred at the 
end whereas future-oriented thoughts associated with affective assimilation would be 
activated when the near-miss occurred at the beginning. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty five Durham University students (16 males, 18 females, 1 failed to report 
gender) were recruited in the university library and paid £3 to take part.  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants answered questions about one of two randomly assigned versions of 
a story about a football match between two teams (Flamengo and Sao Paulo) in the 
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Brazilian Série A. Participants were told that the scores remained tied until Flamengo 
broke the defence and shot at goal narrowly missing. The participants in the high future 
possibility condition (FP:High) were told that the near-miss occurred eight minutes after 
kick-off while those in the low future possibility condition (FP:Low) were told it 
occurred two minutes before the end of the game. Participants were asked to rate which 
of the teams they thought would be in a better mood and to provide their reasons in an 
open-ended question. 
Results and Discussion 
As predicted a significantly higher proportion of participants thought the 
attacking team who nearly scored (Flamengo) would feel better than the defending team 
who nearly conceded (San Paulo) in the FP:High condition than the FP:Low condition: 
χ2(1, N=35) = 5.04, p = .025, w = .38. More specifically, the proportion choosing the 
defending team dropped from a significant majority of 76.5% in the FP:Low condition 
(χ2(1, N=17) = 4.77, p = .029, w = .53), to a non-significant minority of 38.9% in the 
FP:High condition (χ2(1, N=18) = 0.89, p = .346, w = .22). The result therefore suggests 
that the contrast effect, which dominates the affective experience when the near-miss 
occurs at the end of the game, is cancelled out (although not overridden) by the 
assimilation effect when the near-miss occurs at the beginning of the game. 
The reasons participants provided for their choices were coded independently 
and blind to experimental conditions by the two authors into either past-oriented reasons 
(e.g., what did happen or what could have happened in the past), future-oriented reasons 
(e.g., the impacts of the counterfactual on the players’ confidence or their perceived 
chance of scoring or winning), or other-reasons (neither of the two former categories) 
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(see Table 1 for examples). Inter-coder reliability was high (Agreement = 91.4%, Kappa 
= 85.5%) and any disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Supporting our prediction, a significantly higher proportion of future-oriented 
reasons (50% vs. 6% - χ2(1, N=35) = 8.34, p = .004, w = .49), and lower proportion of 
past-oriented reasons (39% vs. 77% - χ2(1, N=35) = 5.04, p = .025, w = .38) were given 
in the FP:High condition.  
Together, these results provide evidence for the moderating effect of future 
possibility on people’s emotional reactions to close outcomes. The presence of future 
possibility enhanced the strength of the assimilation effect, although the effect was not 
strong enough to reverse the contrast effect which dominated when future possibility 
was low. 
The second experiment reported in this paper provided an opportunity to 
replicate these findings using a somewhat different scenario and design. Moreover, as 
well as providing a test of the mediating effects of counterfactual probability estimates, 
the design enabled us to test whether the “assimilation-based satisfaction reversal” 
demonstrated by McMullen and Markman (2002) would arise when future possibility is 
high. 
Experiment 2 
The scenario involved two contestants playing a basketball-throwing game on a 
TV show. Participants judged the contestants’ emotional reactions to either winning or 
losing the game by a small or large margin. 
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Like Experiment 1, we expected their emotional reactions to winning or losing 
by the different margins to be moderated by future possibility (path c in Figure 1a). If 
this single game decides the overall winner of the contest (FP:Low) the contrast effect 
should dominate - the player who wins by a small margin would feel better than the 
player who wins by a large margin, and the player who loses by a small margin would 
feel worse than the player who loses by a large margin (i.e., the proximity of the win or 
loss produces feelings of either disappointment through activating upward 
counterfactuals or relief through activating downward counterfactuals). However, if the 
overall winner is determined by the results of several games and the players had only 
finished the first game (FP:High) the assimilation effect should dominate - the player 
who wins by a small margin would feel worse than the player who wins by a large 
margin, and the player who loses by a small margin would feel better than the player 
who loses by a large margin (i.e., although the margin they have won or lost this single 
game by does not affect their objective proximity to winning the overall contest because 
the actual scores are not carried over, the proximity of the win or loss is an indicator of 
their own and their opponent’s future performance in the game and they may feel either 
fearful of losing or hopeful of winning the subsequent games if they have only just 
scraped or missed out on the win). Moreover, in the FP:High condition, directly 
comparing the emotional consequences of winning or losing by a small margin provides 
a test of the “assimilation-based satisfaction reversal” effect demonstrated by McMullen 
and Markman (2002). If the counterfactual-based assimilation effects are strong enough 
to produce a satisfaction reversal we would find that losing by a small margin feels 
better than winning by a small margin even though the winner is objectively more likely 
to win the overall contest. 
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In this experiment we also examined whether the effects of proximity on 
emotions could be explained by the mediating role of counterfactual probability 
estimates (path ab in Figure 1b). Tests of mediation appropriate for within-participant 
designs were derived from criteria outlined by Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001). 
The criteria entail the following predictions: 1) proximity (independent variable) has an 
effect on counterfactual probability estimates (mediator) – counterfactuals should be 
stronger when the winning or losing margin is small; 2) emotions (dependent variable) 
and counterfactual probability estimates (mediator) should be positively related to each 
other within proximity conditions; and 3) the differences in emotions between proximity 
conditions should be related to the concomitant differences in counterfactual probability 
estimates. We also predicted that the directions of the coefficients in 3) should be 
moderated by future possibility: negative if the lost game is decisive (strong upward 
counterfactuals worsen mood) vs. positive if the lost game is not decisive (strong 
upward counterfactuals improve mood), and positive if the won game is decisive (strong 
downward counterfactuals improve mood) vs. negative if the won game is not decisive 
(strong downward counterfactuals worsen mood). Statistical tests comparing the 
correlations obtained between the FP:High and FP:Low conditions were conducted 
using the formula taken from Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003).  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six undergraduate students (74 females, 22 males) from Durham 
University participated in the study. They received participant credits or £2 for taking 
part.  
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Materials and Procedure 
Participants read about an episode of a TV game show. In this episode, 
contestants competed in two separate arenas located in Los Angeles and Philadelphia. 
The winner of each arena would win $50,000 and advance to next week’s episode, with 
the potential to win $100,000. After several rounds, there were only two players left in 
each arena and the overall winner in each arena was to be determined by a basketball-
throwing game. The two contestants would either play either just one round (FP:Low), 
or they would play best out of five (FP:High). 
Participants were asked to focus either on the losing or winning contestants 
(Outcome:Lose/Win). In the FP:Low condition they were shown the scores of the single 
but decisive games, and in the FP:High condition they were shown the scores of the first 
games played out of the possible five. The presented scores were designed to be close in 
one arena and far apart in the other (order of presentation counterbalanced to remove 
order effects). In the Proximity:Close conditions one of three pairs of scores with a 
difference of 1-point was randomly presented  (21-22, 17-18 or 13-14 in Outcome:Lose; 
28-29, 24-25 or 20-21 in Outcome:Win). In the Proximity:Far conditions, one of three 
pairs of scores with a difference of 15-points was randomly presented (21-36, 17-32 or 
13-28 in Outcome:Lose; 14-29, 10-25 or 6-21 in Outcome:Win). Note that the absolute 
scores of the losers (21, 17 or 13) or winners (29, 25 or 21) are the same across the 
Proximity:Close and Proximity:Far conditions.  
Participants rated the extent to which the winning or losing contestant would 
experience each of 12 emotions (“happy”, “annoyed”, “satisfied”, “frustrated”, 
“pleased”, “miserable”, “content”, “relieved”, “disappointed”, “proud”, “elated”, 
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“discouraged”) from 0 (not at all) to -8 (extremely) for negative emotions and 0 (not at 
all) to +8 (extremely) for positive emotions. Ratings were highly correlated and 
internally reliable (α ≥ .91) and were therefore averaged to form a single score. 
Counterfactual probability estimates were measured by rating how likely they thought 
that the contestant could have won (or lost) the round that had just finished 
(1=extremely unlikely, 9=extremely likely). 
Results and Discussion 
To test whether emotional reactions to winning or losing by the different 
margins were moderated by future possibility, a mixed model ANOVA was conducted 
with outcome (Outcome:win vs. Outcome:lose) and future possibility (FP:Low vs. 
FP:High) as between-participant variables and proximity (Proximity:close vs. 
Proximity:far) as a within-participant variable. As predicted the ANOVA produced a 
significant three-way interaction: F(1,92) = 13.8, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = .131. Simple 
interaction tests showed that although the two-way proximity x future possibility 
interactions were significant within both the Outcome:win (F(1, 46) = 9.69, p = .003, 
ƞp
2
 = .176), and Outcome:lose conditions (F(1, 46) = 5.81, p = .020, ƞp
2
 = .109), the 
underlying patterns were different. These different patterns are illustrated in Table 2 
which includes the results of paired-samples t-tests to test the simple main effects of 
proximity on affect within each future possibility condition.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The effects of proximity on affect in the Outcome:lose condition were consistent 
with our predictions regarding the effects of affective contrast and assimilation. The 
players who lost by a small margin were judged to feel significantly worse when the 
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game was decisive (FP:Low), but marginally better when the game was not decisive 
(FP:High). Whilst the bigger and statistically significant proximity effect size found in 
the FP:Low condition might suggest that the affective contrast effect was stronger than 
the corresponding affective assimilation effect in the FP:High condition, it should be 
noted that the mediation analyses conducted on the counterfactual probability estimates 
do not support this interpretation. 
To follow the criteria for mediation analysis outlined earlier we tested whether 
the mean counterfactual probability estimates were significantly higher in the close 
conditions than the far conditions (criterion 1), and whether the correlations between 
emotions and counterfactual probability estimates within each proximity condition 
(criterion 2) and between the differences in emotions and counterfactual probability 
estimates between the close and far conditions (criterion 3) were negative in the 
Outcome:lose/ FP:Low and Outcome:win/FP:High conditions but. positive in the 
Outcome:lose/FP:High and Outcome:win/FP:Low conditions. 
As shown in Table 2 in the Outcome:lose condition there is support for criterion 
1 (proximity had a significant effect on counterfactual probability estimates in both 
future possibility conditions), but support for criteria 2 and 3 was limited to the FP:High 
condition in which one of the three correlations was significant in the predicted 
direction (i.e., within Proximity:Close). However, in the FP:Low condition the 
directions of the correlations were not consistent with the predictions from which we 
can conclude that there is no evidence that the effect of proximity on affect was 
mediated by the strength of the counterfactuals. What’s more, against our prediction 
regarding the moderated mediation, no significant differences were found between the 
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strength of the correlations between the FP:Low and FP:High conditions (Z = 1.14, p 
= .256; Z = 0.58, p = .560 and Z = 0.98, p = .327 respectively). 
More convincing evidence in support of affective assimilation comes from the 
Outcome:win condition even though the interaction pattern was not fully consistent with 
our predictions. As Table 2 illustrates, in both future possibility conditions, winning by 
a large margin was judged to be more pleasant than winning by a small margin. 
Although we had predicted an effect in the opposite direction in the FP:Low condition 
(i.e., a feeling of relief would make winning by 1-point more pleasing than winning by 
15-points), the effect size in this condition was smaller than the FP:High condition. The 
margin of winning therefore had a bigger impact when the game was not decisive and is 
consistent with assimilation lessening the pleasure of the win through fear of losing the 
next game. Notably this interpretation gains some support from the mediation analysis. 
One of the two within proximity correlations in the FP:High condition was significantly 
negative as predicted (criterion 2) and, although the test was only marginally significant, 
the differences in emotions between proximity conditions were moderately related to the 
concomitant differences in counterfactual probability estimates (criterion 3). However, 
like in the Outcome:Lose condition, we did not find evidence for a moderated mediation 
– none of the three correlations in the FP:High condition was significantly different 
from their counterparts in the FP:Low condition (Z = 0.28, p = .777; Z = 1.24, p = .214 
and Z = 0.54, p = .587 respectively). 
Despite the evidence of assimilation on the winner’s affect it was not however 
strong enough to produce an “assimilation-based satisfaction reversal” against the 
loser’s affect (for which as noted previously there was a trend towards assimilation). 
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Contrary to the prediction that the losers should feel better than the winners when the 
scores are close and the game is not decisive, our results revealed the opposite: the 
winners were judged to feel significantly better than the losers: F(1, 46) = 43.94, p 
< .001, ƞp
2
 = .490. This finding suggests that in the scenario used in this experiment the 
positive or negative emotions associated with winning or losing the first game out of the 
possible five were stronger than any counterfactual-based assimilation-induced 
emotions promoted by the closeness of the outcome. Any fears (or hopes) that may have 
been raised by the closeness of the win (or loss) merely dampened the joy (or 
disappointment) – they did not override or dominate the emotional experience.  
General Discussion 
Our experiments demonstrated that people’s emotional reactions to near-miss 
incidents were contingent on the level of perceived future possibility to win (or lose) the 
final prize. The nature of this contingency was consistent with the predictions of the 
REM that the absence of future possibility promotes counterfactual evaluation and 
affective contrast whereas the presence of future possibility promotes counterfactual 
reflection and affective assimilation. It is argued that overall, the two experiments 
provide more convincing evidence for the enhancement of affective assimilation in the 
presence of future possibility than McMullen and Markman (2002). While the improved 
(or worsened) affective well-being of the basketball team which was trailing (or leading) 
by a small margin in McMullen and Markman’s (2002) study could be attributed to the 
enhanced hopefulness (or fearfulness) due to their objective proximity to winning (or 
losing), our experiments ruled out this alternative explanation by keeping the objective 
proximity to the final victories unaffected by the near-miss at goal (Experiment 1) or  
the winning (or losing) margin (Experiment 2). Therefore, the observed pattern of 
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participants’ judgments of affect in our experiments can more confidently be attributed 
to the assimilation effect brought about by counterfactual thinking. 
In addition, the psychological mechanisms underpinning the observed effect 
were explored in both experiments. In support of the REM, participants’ free responses 
in Experiment 1 suggested that a temporal-focus-switching mechanism plays an 
important part in the observed effect of future possibility. While the presence of future 
possibility promoted future-oriented thinking, the absence of it promoted past-oriented 
thinking. Moreover, Experiment 2 provided both supporting and refuting evidence that 
the observed effects of proximity on emotions were mediated by counterfactual 
probability estimates. Firstly, as predicted close outcomes produced the strongest 
counterfactuals.  Secondly, the results indicate that the relationship between 
counterfactual probability estimates and emotions is dependent on the perception of 
future possibility. That is, the strength of this relation seems to vary across different 
future possibility conditions. However, this variation was not found to be significant. 
The main reason for this insignificant result is that the counterfactual probability 
estimates were not affecting emotions in a predicted way in some of the conditions. 
While some correlations in the FP:High conditions were consistent with assimilation-
effect domination (i.e., stronger counterfactuals produce more fear of losing or hope of 
winning), the correlations in the FP:Low conditions were not consistent with affective 
contrast-effect domination (i.e., stronger counterfactuals did not produce more joy at 
winning or disappointment at losing). 
These findings highlight the benefits of using mediation analysis to test the 
proposed mechanisms underpinning observed effects. It not only provides insights into 
when and how strongly people’s affective responses to near-misses are shaped by 
  19 
counterfactuals, but also indicates the necessity of considering alternative explanations 
when the mediation tests fail to lend any support to the proposed mechanisms. For 
example, for the losers in the FP:Low condition, although proximity was influencing 
affect in the predicted direction (i.e., close scores worsened people’s mood), this effect 
was not found to be mediated by counterfactual probability ratings (i.e., the correlation 
between counterfactual probability estimates and emotions was in the opposite direction 
of the total effect of proximity on emotions). This leads to the speculation that in this 
condition proximity was affecting people’s mood via other mechanisms.  
One of these mechanisms could be a psychological process called social 
comparison. Festinger (1954) posits that people evaluate the validity or the 
appropriateness of their attitudes, beliefs or abilities by making inter-individual peer 
comparisons. Although the participants in our experiment were not real actors in the 
given situation, our scenario featured a one-on-one sports competition which may have 
encouraged the participants to draw inter-individual comparisons between the 
competitors. The Self-evaluation Maintenance model of social behaviour (SEM) (Tesser 
1988) hypothesized that the motivation to engage in self-evaluation raises as the 
perceived closeness to another performer increases, indicating that perceived similarity 
(on one or more dimensions) promotes social comparisons. Thus, for the players who 
narrowly lost the game in our experiment, the closeness between their scores and their 
opponents’ might have been treated as an indicator that they are similar in ability (to 
throw basketballs) and provoked the losers to compare their current standings with the 
winner, resulting in an affective contrast effect and a sense of deprivation (Morse & 
Gergen, 1970) (e.g., “She has won $50,000 but I didn’t). Akin to counterfactual 
thinking, social comparisons are also capable of producing assimilation effects 
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depending on situations (see, for example, Mussweiler , 2003), one of which could be 
when future possibility is present  (i.e., comparing oneself with better-off others can 
result in self-enhancement if success is perceived to be attainable while comparing 
oneself with worse-off others can result in worry or fearfulness if one perceived 
him/herself as being vulnerable) (see Markman & McMullen, 2003 for a review). Since 
we did not measure the extent to which participants have engaged in social comparisons, 
it is not clear how and how much this psychological process might have contributed to 
the effect of proximity on emotions in other conditions.  
Overall, the results of our mediation analyses advise future research to consider 
the possibility that there are multiple paths via which near-misses can affect emotions. 
Not only could these mechanisms be conceptually distinctive (e.g., while social 
comparisons occur on an inter-individual basis, counterfactual thinking involves 
creating a hypothetical world and comparing that with the real one), but they also might 
have different implications not only for the valence of the emotions evoked but also the 
specific types of emotions.  This could be explored in future experiments by measuring 
people’s spontaneous emotional reactions to actual near-miss events. This approach 
may have an advantage over scenario-based studies like ours where participants are 
simply asked to rate lists of predetermined affect-based adjectives. An emotion-listing 
technique enables researchers to identify the emotions that are most likely to be 
activated spontaneously in real life situations that have personal relevance to the 
participants. Recent research by Sweeny and Vohs (2012), for example, has 
demonstrated how near-miss relief is a readily identifiable emotion specifically elicited 
in response to narrowly avoiding a negative outcome. 
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Identifying the specific emotions activated also has the potential to better 
understand the functional basis of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008). For 
example, whereas disappointment may strengthen people’s intentions to find ways of 
avoiding future negative outcomes (Roese, 1994), other emotions like hopefulness may 
energize people in committing to their goals particularly when contrasts are drawn 
between their positive fantasies and the obstacles associated with the present reality 
(Oettingen et al., 2009). 
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Table 1 Examples of Coding Categories used in Content Analysis 
Category Examples 
Past Implication Because they (Sao Paulo) nearly lost the game at the last 
minute but didn’t. The Flamingo players will be annoyed they 
missed the last chance 
 They (Sao Paulo)manage to get 1 point out of a game they 
could have lost 
 Because they (Sao Paulo) were close to losing in the last few 
minutes and they stayed strong and defended. 
 They (Sao Paulo)have weathered an offensive play without 
conceding a goal 
Future 
Implication 
They (Flamengo) gained the advantage, breaking the defense 
showing it can be done scoring the opponents. Though they 
missed, they know it can be done . 
 Despite having narrowly missing the target their team 
(Flamengo) effort was successful at breaking through the 
defense and taking a shot. This would give confidence to try to 
do it again. Also Sao Paolo may be nervous from the near miss 
and frustrated because of being outmaneuvered by the 
opposition. 
 Whilst most of the game was even, the slight edge in better 
play at the end for the Flamengo players will allow then to feel 
they are the better side and give a psychological boost going 
into other games, and for the remainder of this game 
 Because they (Flamengo) shows promising signs of winning the 
match. Their team is on the offense and with high spirits may 
well have another attack 
Others Because they (Flamengo)are in the fighting mode, which 
makes Sao Paulo get in a panic 
 They (Flamengo) are showing excellent skill and teamwork. 
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Table 2 The Total Effect of Proximity on Emotions and the Mediation of Counterfactual 
Probability Estimates across Conditions 
 Outcome:lose Outcome:win 
 FP:Low FP:High FP:Low FP:High 
Proximity on affect 
Prediction M-close < M-far 
(worsens mood) 
M-close > M-far 
(improves mood) 
M-close > M-far 
(improves mood) 
M-close < M-far 
(worsens mood) 
 
M-close (SD) 
 
-2.25 (1.03) 
 
-1.03 (1.64) 
 
3.10 (0.76) 
 
1.76 (1.25) 
M-far (SD) -1.78 (1.27) -1.45 (1.38) 3.38 (0.37) 2.80 (0.76) 
Effect Size (d) -0.403* 0.274
 Ϯ
 -0.438 -0.914*** 
Proximity on counterfactual probability 
 
Prediction M-close > M-far 
(strengthens 
upward  
counterfactual) 
M-close > M-far 
 (strengthens 
upward  
counterfactual) 
M-close > M-far 
 (strengthens 
downward  
counterfactual) 
M-close > M-far 
 (strengthens 
downward 
counterfactual) 
 
M-close (SD) 
 
7.67 (1.24) 
 
6.79 (1.56) 
 
7.04 (1.57) 
 
6.79 (1.41) 
M-far (SD) 3.75 (1.70) 4.08 (1.35) 3.58 (1.53) 3.54 (1.25) 
Effect Size (d) 2.62*** 1.86*** 2.23*** 2.44*** 
a
 Correlations between affect and counterfactual probability 
 
Prediction negative 
(strong upward 
counterfactuals 
worsen mood) 
positive 
(strong upward 
counterfactuals 
improve mood) 
positive 
(strong downward 
counterfactuals 
improve mood) 
negative 
(strong downward 
counterfactuals 
worsen mood) 
Within proximity conditions 
Close condition .067 .395* -.084 -.170 
Far condition .334 .166 -.068 -.423* 
Between proximity conditions 
Close-far 
differences 
.327 .037 -.113 -.274
Ϯ
 
Ϯp < .10, * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
aKilmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests showed that data were not normally distributed. 
The coefficients obtained from non-parametric Spearman’s rho tests are therefore reported. 
 
 
